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Summary findings
Estache, Gonzalez, and Trujillo show how relatively  Reforms have significantly improved average port
standard methodologies can help to measure the  performance.
efficiency gains from reforming the organization of port  *  The analytically sound performance rankings
infrastructure,  how those measures can be used to  allowed by the port-specific efficiency measures can help
promote  competition between ports, and how  to promote  yardstick competition in the sector. These
competition can be built into an incentive-driven  rankings are superior to those that would emerge from
regulatory regime.  use of partial productivity indicators. They account for
As illustration, they use a case study of port reform in  the joint effects of all inputs on outputs-which  is
Mexico in 1993, the first efficiency analysis of port  crucial, because it avoids the risk of inconsistent rankings
restructuring in a developing country.  based on different partial indicators, arbitrarily chosen.
Their analysis, which covers 1996-99  and relies on a  Developing the database needed to measure efficiency
stochastic production  frontier,  shows that overall,  in countries with no strong tradition of database
Mexico has achieved annual efficiency gains of 6-8  development is an enormous task-especially  in
percent in the use of port infrastructure since assigning  transport sectors, where the tradition  of generating
its management to independent.  decentralized operators.  databases useful to policymakers is in its infancv. The
Changes in relative performance ratings are revealing.  most immediate effect of this exercise was to reveal the
They identify consistent sets of leaders and laggards,  poverty of the database in the Mexican port sector and
including some that would not have been identified by  the need for regulators to invest in its development.
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1. Introduction
Ports are one of the key components of the logistics chain and, this is why the desire to cut costs in the
sector is becoming a mainstream component of most  transport policy reforms. The most  common
inshtument  relied on is the introduction of some type of competition to stimulate efficiency. To achieve
competition in ports, there are two main approaches. The first is ex-ante competition and relies on the
auction of the right to operate the port or in the port. The second is ex-post competition between ports and
stems from the assessment of the relative and absolute performance of each port--the basis of yardstick
competition or competition by comparison. 3 Both forms of competitions are built-in the Mexican reforms
initiated in 1993 which makes Mexico a particularly representative and interesting case study.
A common feature in post-reform monitoring is the focus on partial productivity indicators such
as waiting time, labor productivity, use of capacity. These partial indicators are all useful but they can be
quite misleading since  they do not necessarily generate the same ranking of ports. This is why, in Mexico's
reforms just as in most other port reforms they only have a limited value for the implementation of some
of the recent regulatory mechanisms which require some explicit consistent estimates of efficiency gains.
IWe  are particularly  endebted  to our colleagues  at the Mexican  "Port Regulatory  Agency",  Messrs.  Gonzalo  Dolores  de la Merced,
Lamaroy  and Pastrana  who  provided  unrelentless  support  in preparing  the empirical  part of the paper and educating  us on  the Mexican
port system.  We are also grateful to Antonio  Alvarez,  Javier Campos, Tim Coelli, Rafael Cuesta,  Luis Guasch, Gustavo  Nombela,
Sergio  Perelman, Martin  Rossi and Alma Trujillo for useful discussions,  comments and sugestions.  Any mistake  and all opinions
should  be attributed  to the authors exclusively  and not to the institutions  they are affiliated  with.
2The  first author  is affiliated  with the World  Bank,  Washington.D.C.,  USA  and ECARES,  Universite  Libre  de Bruxelles,  Belgium  and
while  the other two are with the Departamento  de Analisis  Econ6mico  Aplicado,  Universidad  de Las Palmas  Gran Canaria
3In  countries with multiple ports, this requires their decentralization and an increase in their autonomy to promote inter-port
competition  within the country-the  strategy adopted by Mexico. In smaller countries, this requires international  comparisons-
which are often more difficult to implement  because of the difficulties of comparing prices internationally.2
The measurement of the absolute performance stemming from the joint of effects of all inputs on outputs
is needed for the revision of the price caps adopted by Mexico--another  common feature in port reform-
and should be should be analytical-i.e.  model or formula driven. These absolute performance measures
could also be combined to generate  relative performance  assessments  and promote inter-port competition.
With this background,  the specific focus of the paper is twofold. First, we show that even in a set
up with limited data availability we could  assess through the estimation of a production frontier the
efficiency gains achieved since Mexico introduced its reforms.We also discuss how the measure of these
gains could be used in the context of a port tariff revision.  Our results could indeed be helpful to regulators
in the revision of the price caps under which it regulates its ports to share some of the gains with the users
and give stronger incentive to improve efficiency to the poorest performers. Second,  we shoNv  why
efficiency measurements generated from production frontiers have the seeds of what could become a
standard instrument to promote ex-post competition and formal yardstick competition in the sector.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the recent reforms in the Mexican port
system. Section 3 summarizes the main results  available in  the literature. Section 4 discusses the
methodology followed to assess the efficiency effects of the reform in Mexico and the results of the
analysis. Section 5 offers some concluding thoughts.
2. The Reform of the Mexican ports
The reform of the Mexican  port system started in 1993 and followed  a pattern similar to that of many
other reforming countries. In Mexico, as in most countries, the port system was until then managed
centrally by a network of public firms. This section describes the Mexican port system  and its reform,
emphasizing the institutional framework resulting from the changes and the facts that are most relevant
to the assessment of improvements in performance.
2.1. Market Structure
Mexico is supported by a large port system composed of 108 ports and terminals 4 distributed along
the 11,500 km coastline of the country, with a total berth length of 110 km. Half of these facilities are
located on the Pacific coast, and the other half on the Mexican Gulf and the Caribbean. There are 39 ports
dedicated to commercial activities, and approximately a similar number are fishing ports; 22 ports are
specialized in tourist traffics, and 8 are specialized in oil traffic. This system handles 85% of total
international trade, and more than 7 million passengers.
The core of the traffic is however extremely concentrated. Most goes through 27 commercial,
industrial and tourist ports, and 10 terminals specialized in oil and mineral ores' traffics. In 1999, the main
8 ports handled 71% of total cargoes, four of them in the Atlantic coast and the other four on the Pacific.
However,  if oil is excluded, basically half of total movements of cargo are performed by 5 ports: Veracruz,
Tampico and Altamira on the Gulf of Mexico; and Manzanillo and Lazaro Cardenas on the Pacific side.
Total movement of cargo by Mexican ports increased from 169 million tons in 1990 to 248 million
in 1999 Passengers' traffic has doubled during the same period, while container traffic has multiplied by
4Facilities located outside port areas, as defined by the government, dedicated to port operations.3
three. The main cargo types are oil and its derivatives, with a share of 62%, followed by mineral ores
which amounts 23% of total tons handled by Mexican ports. General cargo, including both bulk and
containerized  goods, represents 8.5% of total tons. The percentage of goods transported in containers over
total general cargo (containerization index) exhibits very  low values -36%  in  1999-  compared to
international standards-but  it is improving. From the total TEUs handled by the port system, the ports
of Manzanillo  and Veracruz moved about 70%. These  two ports have the more modern container  terminals
of the country, and therefore their productivity  and efficiency  are expected to be higher for than other ports.
2.2. Restructuring and privatization
Modernization and reform of Mexican ports started in 1993. As part of the strategy used to reform
the port system, two type of actions were followed.  First, an adequate legal framework  was needed to allow
private firms to enter the port industry as operators. This was built in the new Ports Law passed in 1993.
The second action was the dismantling of the public agency Puertos Mexicanos (PUMEX), responsible
up to  1993 for the ports'  network and was the only agency in the country authorized to build port
infrastructures and to provide port services. The reform rested on three key instruments: decentralization,
privatization and introduction of competition in the port system.
Decentralization  implies  that  each  port  must  have  an  autonomous,  self-financing  Port
Administration,  so that the government will have only a supervisory role over the system; it was pursued
by creating independent  Port Administrations (Administraciones  Portuarias Integrales, APIs) at each port
or group of small ports, which are publicly owned companies to which the administration of ports was
directly granted.  Thus, for example the API of the Veracruz  port is legally established as a company whose
shares are owned 99.8% by the federal govemment,  and 0.2% by the development  bank BANOBRAS. The
board of the APIs must include representatives from the States and municipalities, and some from the
private sector. The APIs were granted the rights over the port assets, and authorized to grant themselves
concessions over those same assets to private firms, but making it clear that in no case those assets will
be permanently transferred to the private sector. APIs pay compensations to the federal government for
the use of assets publicly  owned. The federal government, through Secretaria de  Comunicaci6n y
Transporte (SCT), keeps the role of port authority, and it is the agency that grants all concessions, and
licenses. Additionally, SCT acts as regulator in those cases where competition is absent or it is not strong
enough, by determining maximum tariffs to be charged to users. Matters on safety are performed by the
navigation authority (Capitania de Puertos), which is an agency independent from SCT.
Privatization  implies that the port industry must be open to the participation of private investors,
both nationals and foreign, for the operation of terminals and other facilities, and eventually even the port
administration. In almost every port, private participation has now been introduced through auctions for
concession contracts between APIs and private firms to provide port services. For simple services, such
as towage and pilotage, only a license is required, which can be obtained by any interested party
sufficiently qualified. APIs are expetced to eventually be sold to the private sector. Private participation
has induced significant changes in the port industry, in terms of investments on infrastructure, and
improvements  in quality of service and tariffs.  Thus, total investments  in equipment and new terminals  was
around 6,000 million pesos between 1995-1998, 60% of which was private investment. Investments in
infrastructure and equipment have already generated substantial capacity increases for the Mexican port
system. In 1993, the estimated installed capacity allowed to handle 59 million tons of commercial cargo.
However, ports only moved 24 million tons. The reforms further increased this capacity to over 90 million
tons by the end of the 1999 but also increased utilization to over 55 million tons.4
Liberalization  and Competition,  between  ports and between operators  within ports, resulted from
some restriction in the auctions for concessions and required liberalization of tariffs and elimination of
cross-subsidies  and barriers to entry. First, according to norms on competition, all request by private firms
to participate in public auctions to obtain concessions over port assets were evaluated by the competition
agency, CFC, to avoid risks of excessive market power after privatization. In practice, this obligation did
not impose a relevant restriction over the outcomes, since most applicants were authorized to participate
without reservations. However, an important ruling was the initial restriction for firms not to win more
than one concession  on each coast (Pacific, Atlantic). This geographical  restriction  was later modified, and
now the only restriction is that a firm must not gain a relevant position in the relevant market (this was
applied, for example, for the tourist cruise markets).
Second, port tariffs have been generally liberalized. Regulation is only used in those cases where
it is considered  that there is not enough competition  between operators.  The Ports Law establishes that the
Federal Commission of Competition  (the Mexican anti-trust institution) is to examine these questions and
to determine when tariff regulation is or is not required. Port tariffs charged by APIs to ships for the use
of common infrastructures are subject to price caps. The limits approximate the long-run marginal cost of
each port--operating  and investment costs--and  therefore, limits and hence tariffs are different for each port
but close to the level that would result from competition. To promote incentives for cost reductions and
innovation, the limits are to be revised every five years to reflect any efficiency gains that may have been
obtained from competition between the ports. In addition, with respect to the labor market, the reform
transformed collective bargaining into firm-level bargaining, thus allowing firms to negotiate with their
workers according to local and business conditions. As a result, the number of port workers employed by
the public sector has been reduced, but total port employment by private firmns  is rising, due to an increase
in the activity of ports. For example, the port of Manzanillo had 2,100 workers before the reform, and at
the end of 1997 the number had doubled. In Veracruz, with an initial number of 6,647 employees, the
increased was not so spectacular in relative terms, but it had also risen to 8,260.
Decentralization started in  February 1994, when the APIs were created and assumed the finctions
of planning, building infrastructures and promoting the port, apart from tasks on safety. They act as
landlords since the Ports Law precludes them generally to act as port operators and requires them to
contract with third parties. However, there are not full port authorities, since that role is legally attributed
to SCT. The main 16 ports created APIs accountable to the federal government mostly. Additionally, 5
ports have APIs which are controlled by State governments, all these are specialized ports (tourism,
fishing) or attend small local markets. There is only a private API, in the port of Acapulco, specialized on
tourists' traffic. Both the 5 State-controlled  APIs and the one of Acapulco share the characteristic that the
API is also the operator of port services, due to the small size of ports, or to their specialization. The last
phase considered for the process of ports' reform is the transfer of APIs to the private sector, by selling
their shares to investors. There is currently only one private API (Acapulco), and two ports are in the
process of privatization (Topolobambo and Guaymas). There are no established dates or conditions for
privatizing the port administration of the main ports of the country.
Overall, the most relevant fact emerging from this brief overview is that Mexico wants competition
between its ports as a way of improving the competitiveness of these ports. To achieve this goal and to
make the most of the regulatory tools the reform has granted to its regulator, Mexico needs to be able to
measure the improvements in efficiency in each port in absolute and relative terms. It needs an absolute
measure because the limits to the regulated  tariff will have to reflect every five years the average efficiency
gains achieved. It needs a relative measure because the spirit of the reform requires competition to be5
sustained as a matter of process and that this,  in turn, requires a regular assessment of the relative
performance of the main ports, therefore creating the basis of a system of yardstick competition. It turns
out that five years have just passed since the beginning of the reform and that enough data is available to
make a fair assessment of absolute and relative efficiency improvements in the main Mexican ports.
3.  A brief  survey of  efficiency measures in the port sector
The efficiency literature on ports' performance  is relatively modest in comparison  to the efficiency
literature available on other infrastructure activities. It is evolving however and can be classified into two
main groups. 5 The first covers partial indicators  of productivity  in the port system but presents only a very
limited view of efficiency zooming on specific ports. The second, more recent and much less developed,
adopts the types of approaches recommended by this paper.6
The  literature covering  partial  indicators of  port  productivity  continues to  prevail  among
practitioners as revealed by a random look at annual reports published by port authorities 7. The more
academic literature adopting this approach to focus on specific ports spans over a 15 years period starting
in the early 1980s after which a first attempt at using these indicators for inter-port comparisons was
suggested by Tongzon (1995) and Talley (.  Their approach was quite simple and consisted in defining a
set of comparable indicators. Heaver (1995) or the Australian Productivity Commission (1998) went
further and used comparable indicators to try to see how inter-port competition could be promoted
analytically. Similar studies relevant to the concerns of a regulator include the study of scale economies
by Jara et al. (1997) or Cullinane and Khanna (1998). Fernandez et al. (1999) also covers the effects of
privatization. While all these studies generate useful insights on the performance of ports and the factors
driving their costs, their main drawback  was their partial  view and the failure to recognize  the need to have
an analytically consistent approach to efficiency measurement.
The second generation of studies relying on formal measures  of efficiency is an attempt to address
this failure. It is still too recent to have generated  many publications.  However, the diversity of approaches
followed by the relatively modest volume of papers is quite revealing of the lack of concensus on the ideal
approach. The main contributions of these studies are summarized  in Table 2. A few clear trends appear.
In general, researchers focus on panels of ports cost or production performance to make the most
of the information available. Only two papers rely on a simple cross-section.  Roll and Hayuth (1993) rely
on data commonly available from annual reports in ports and Tongzon (2001) covers 16 ports for which
he obtained comparable data for 1996.
Second, the models preferences are evenly distributed between stochastic frontiers and DEA, with
one study by Bafios, Coto and Rodriguez (1999) also testing a distance function to show the difficulty
faced by ports in adjusting in the short run its quasi fix factors. Liu (1995) focuses on production to
5 See  Trujillo,  L and  G. Nombela  (2000)  for a longer  review  of port  economics.
6For  a recent  overview  of the literature  see Campos,  Estache  and Trujillo  (2001);  "Information,  Accounting  and Regulation
for Argentina's  railways",  WBI,  mimeo;  For a more  rigorous  survey  see, Coelli,  T., D.S..P.  Rao and G.E. Battese or CRB
(1998).  For a survey  targeted  to infrastructure  regulators,  see  Coelli,  Estache,  Perelman  and Trujillo  (2000).
7It  includes  papers  by Neufville  and Tsunokawa  (1981),  Suykens  (, Kim and Sachis  (1986)  providing  simple  productivity
assessments.  The  role of investment  has  been  studied  by Shneerson  (1981)  and  planning  by Bobrovitch  (1982),  Sheerson  (1983)
or Goodman  (1984).6
calculate  technical efficiency and compares  the influence  of public and private ownership in Britain. Coto,
Banlos  and Rodriguez (2000) test a cost frontier. Roll and Hayuth (1993) show how DEA can be useful in
assessing the relative effectiveness of various ways of organizing port services when limited data is
available. Martinez, Diaz, Navarro and Ravelo (1999) relies on a DEA to assess the evolution of the
relative efficiency of Spain's ports. Tongzon (2001) uses DEA to make an international comparison of
efficiency in 4 Australian and  12 other ports from around the world.
A third noticeable feature of the comparison of the studies is that all stochastic frontiers are tested
for translogs but the type of technical progress-i.e.  neutral vs. non neutral-- built-in varies across studies.
Moreover, the production or output measures also vary. Coto et al. (2000), Martinez et al. (1999), Banios
et al. (1999) and Roll and Hayuth (1993) all adopt a measure of physical quantities of merchandises
manipulated. In addition, Roll and Hayuth include service level, service satisfaction and ship traffic as
outputs. Martinez et al. and Roll and Hayuth model explicitly the multi-product nature of ports 8. They
aggregate the three main components of the port activity: tons of merchandises  moved, passengers loaded
and unloaded and number of vehicles with passengers.  The product can also aggregate freight (a weighted
sum of containers, general cargo and grain) and service level (ratio of hanlding time to total stay) as done
by Roll and Hayuth (1993). Liu (1995), Bafios et al. (1999) and Coto et al. (2000) assume a single output
technology and measure output through the volume of merchandise handled. Liu (1995) measures the
output through the revenue generated-excluding  revenue from the sale of goods. This approach assumes
that the ports are quite competitive and that tariffs reflect costs and hence that revenue reflects output.
All studies model capital and labor as inputs-as  expected.  The labor input is approximated by the
number of employees or the related expenses. Roll and Hayuth (1993), Banios  et al. (1999) and Tongzon
(2001) adopt the first option and define labor as the average annual number of workers in the port. Liu
(1995) and Martinez et al. (1999) assume that the total wage payments are a good approximation of the
labor input. The modeling of the capital input gives rise to more approaches. Liu (1995) defines capital
as the net value of fixed capital, including land, buildings, docks, berths, roads, storage and equipment.
Roll and Hayuth (1993) consider that capital is the annnual average of all capital invested in ports and
installations. Martinez et al. (1999) assumes that it can be approximated by depreciation expenditures.
Bafios et al. consider two types: one variable,  approximated  as a percentage of the net value and one quasi-
fixed defmied as the length of the docks/berth  with a depth over 4 meters. Other production factors include
"other expenditures" representing intermediate inputs (Martinez et al., 1999); energy consumption, non-
recurrent labor inputs (Banios  et al. (1999); and the diversity of load to pick up the degree of specialization
of the port (Roll and Hayuth, 1993). Tongzon  (2001) includes separately  the number of cranes, of container
berths, of tugs and of terninal  areas. In addition, he adds a quality variable approximated by the delay
time-which  may seem strange since it could be seen as a proxy for an output as well.
aSo  does Tongzon but because the two outputs case  yields unrealistic  results,  he ends up focusing  on a single output.7
Table 2. A survey of the literature  on efficiency measures in the ports  sector
Author  Data (1)  Model  (2)  Functional  Form  Variables  (3)  Estimation  Efficiency  measure (5)
Method (4)
Liu  Panel  SPF  Translog  Yl (X1, X2, Zj, Z2, Z3, Z4, T)  Model 1:  Technical efficiency  1983-1990
(1995)  28 UK ports  Neutral and non neutral  OLS, ML  Mod.  I (ML):  78.0
1983-1990  Technological  change  Model 2:  Mod 2  (GLS):  76.9
Within,  GLS,  Mod  2 (ML):  68.3
ML  Mod 2 (ML, with  T):  69.7
Coto, Batlos and  Panel  SCF  Translog  CTo (YO, WI,  W2, W3, T)  Within  Economic  efficiency  1985-1989
RodrHguez  27 Spanish ports  Non neutral  Maximum:  100
(2000)  1985-1989  Technological  change  Minimum  11
Average  33
Bafios, Coto and  Panel  SCF  Translog  CVO (YO, WI,  W3, W4, W5, T)  Instrumental  Technical efficiency  1985-1997
Rodriguez  27 Spanish ports  DF  Neutral  D (YO, XI,  X3,X4, X5, T)  Variables  Distance  function
(1999)  1985-1997  Technological  change  Maximum:  100
Minimum  15
Average  41
Roll and Hayuth  Cross Section  DEA  Not applicable  Yo, Yl,  Y2, Y3, XI,  X2, X6 Not relevant  Average  Medium  1993o
(1993)  1993  Efficiency  78.2
Total ports:  .93.4
Ports region  I and 2  86.1
Martinez,  Diaz,  Navarro  Panel  DEA  Not applicable  Yo, YI, XI, X2, X3 Not relevant  Average  global  1993-1997
and Ravelo  26 Spanish ports  efficiency  88.7
(1999)  1993-1997  Group I:, II and III  80.1
85.7
Tongzon (2001)  Panel  DEA  Not applicable  Yo XI, X2, X3, X4, X5,ZI  Not  relevant  Average efficiency  if:  1996
16 ports  Tests both CRS and  Delay Time  Constant Retum  to Scale  59.5
1996  VRS  Variable return to  Scale  93.1
(1): To indicate sample  size
(2): SPF: Stochastic  production  frontier; SCF: Stochastic  cost frontier; DF: Distance  function  and D Distance; DEA:  Data Envelopment  Analysis;
(3): CT: total cost
CV: variable  cost
Yo: Production  (measured  in tons of merchandise  or TEUs handled) YI: Production  (measured  by billing for services)  Y2: Service  level (number  of containers  moved/hour),  Y3: User satisfactiooY4:  N°  of ships
arrivals
Xl: Labor  Input; X2: Capital  Input;X 3: Intermediate  Inputs;X4:  Variable  capital; X5: Quasi  fixed Capital InputX6:  Uniformity  of merchandise
WI: labor price; W 2: capital price;  W3: intermediate  input price;  W4: variable  capital price; W 5: quasi fixed capital price
T: time trend;  Zl: port size/terminal  area; Z2: port location73: port  ownership;  Z4: capital intensity
(4) OLS:  ordinary least  squares,  ML: maximum  likelihood;  GLS: generalized  least squares
(5): Measured in %; and in some cases  calculated  by the  authors based  on published results.
(6): Specific  Efficiency  levels  assessed8
For the two papers with cost functions, Bafios et al. (1999) and Coto et al. (2000), labor prices are
approximated  by the ratio of total labor cost to the number of workers and the price of  capital is obtained
by dividing the amortization of the period by the length of docks in Coto et al, 2000. Banos et al. (1  999)
distinguish between the price of variable capital, defined as the ratio of investments realized in one year
over investments over the previous year and the price of capital quasi -fixed approximated by the ratio
between the use of capacity and the length of docks with a depth over 4 meters. The price of intermediate
inputs is the ratio of consumption, external services and service costs over other port expenditures. The
price of energy is obtained by allocating the energy inputs cost to ports according to the volume handled 9.
The environmental variables covered are usually included to approximate some institutional or
market specific characteristics and are usually built in the second stage of two stages approaches to the
measurement  of efficiency.  Liu (1995) relies on 3 variables.  Ownership  is a dummy differentiating  between
private, trust and municipal ports. The size of ports enters as a dummy distinguishing between large, and,
"medium and small" ports. Localization on the shore vs. elsewhere also enters as a dummy. Finally, the
intensity of capital is measured as the ratio between the net value of fixed capital and the total wage bill.
Coto et al. (2000) rely on a dummy as well to distinguish  between autonomous  and other ports and on dock
length to model the relevance of the size of ports.
While intuitively quite attractive, the idea of using these variables in a second stage to explain
efficiency is criticized by some of the top econometricians in the field. Indeed, starting with Battese and
Coelli (1995), the criticism is based on the fact that the variable used in the second stage should have
already been used in the first stage to ensure that inefficiency is measured properly. The failure to do so
leads to a mispecified model. To the extent that they are relevant, the residual of the first stage generate
wrong estimates  of efficiency. The critique is however not addressed  to the general approach since frontiers
can indeed provide other policy insights on the functioning of ports
This leads to a discussion of the estimation methods used. As can be seen in Table 1, the diversity
of methods used is quite impressive. Two stages methods relying on instrumental  variables and maximum
likelyhood approaches are quite common to estimate the parametric frontiers. Most of them also look into
the fixed effects of each port to ease the relative performance assessment. As for the non-parametric
approach, it may be worth pointing out  that Martinez et al. (1999) and Tongzon (2001) rely on a
methodology proposed by BCC (Banker, Charnes and Cooper, 1984) to account for scale. They adopt a
two stages radial approach to generate the efficient frontier by solving a linear programming model.
While not strictly comparable, the measures of efficiency obtained by the various authors are
summarized in the last column since none of the papers rely on methods comparing strictly the same
sample with different methods or of the same time period with comparable output variables. Liu (1995)
does focus on technical efficiency but does not compute port specific efficiency measures. He computes
simply an average which he uses as a variable to explain in a second stage. His comparison of the various
ports leads him to suggest that in the UK for the 1983-1990 period, there is no significant advantage to
private or public ownership when the policy environment is competitive. He also shows that size matters
and being larger helps, that location matters but not a lot and that capital intensity has no significant
impact. Coto et al. (2000) assess the economic efficiency of each Spanish port for the second half of the
1  980s. The first stage of their analytical  works reveals a ranking in which the smallest ports were the most
efficient and the largest the least efficient and that autonomy did not necessarily help. When testing in a
9Most  of the  definitions  of  the  variables  in this  paper  are  quite  complex  to implement  and  may  reflect  characteristics  specific
to the  way  the  annual  report  is presented  in Spain  by port  authorities.9
second stage the relevance of size for the level of efficiency, they conclude that sized does in fact not
matter but that autonomy hurts efficieny levels.
Covering a  longer period for the same set of ports,  1985-1997, and  focusing on technical
efficiency, Bafios,  Coto and Rodriguez (1999) conclude that there is an overcapitalization  of the sector and
that the Spanish ports are not minimizing costs, hence reinforcing the attractiveness of the distance
function-although  both the cost and the distance function lead to the same policy conclusions. Relying
on DEA, Tongzon (2001) confirms the relevance of the degree of capital and labor utilization in the
assessment of efficiency. Also relying on DEA, Martinez et al. (1999) show that a three level grouping of
the Spanish ports (large,  medium, and small) for the 93-97 period  refines the earlier  results. In recent years,
the largest ports have been the most efficient and exhibited the largest efficiency gains. The smallest ports
on the other hand have been the victim of a progressive decline in their performance and medium ports
seem to catch up. The main additional policy contribution of the Roll and Hayuth (1993) paper is to
confirm that location matters, as revealed by a different sample.
Ignoring momentarily the doubts that the Battese-Coelli critique could cast on the results, an
overall glance at the last column is however useful to get a rough order of magnitude of the levels of
efficiency that can be expected for various types of combinations  of models and output variables in sector.
It suggests  first that the efficiency  of the sector is likely to be stronger in terms of production  variables than
in terms of cost variables, confirming that the local monopoly power many ports have is sufficient to
generate rent which regulators are failing to redistribute to users. It also shows that the standard policy
concerns such as overcapitalization, size or autonomy can be relevant but not always in the expected
direction.
Overall, in addition to these fairly generic results, the overview provides some insights on what
seems to be the minimum information requirements needed to implement a comparative performance
evaluation in the port sector. The multiple output nature of the port business yields a large variety of
indicators to pick from which includes non transport related activities such as the rental of space for any
purpose.  If allocative efficiency is important a cost function must be  estimated. The challenge of
separating  costs between variable  and total is in itself significant  but modest  in comparison  to the challenge
of assessing the opportunity cost of capital in many developing countries. This may explain why the
production function will probably have to be the preferred option for efficiency measures for developing
countries. The main challenge for labor inputs is obtaining a disaggregation  distinguishing white and blue
collars and/or permanent and temporary employees. Capital inputs will generally  be the most difficult one
to assess, in particular in the context of a cost function. The physical inputs or their monetary valuations
will often provide good approximations. Intermediate  inputs tends to be a residual category. Other factors
include anything that the analyst thinks may be relevant to the port activity level. This includes of course
its ownership (public vs private) in international comparisons and in some countries. It can also include
market size (in Mexico, the East and West coast markets are different) and the port size, if the data
available does not allow to build in economies of scale carefully enough. Finally, a time trend will often
have to be tested in most of these models to pick up any technological change.
4. Measuring  the efficiency effects of Mexico's port reform10
This section summarizes the major steps needed to generate the efficiency measures. It cover a
somewhat detailed discussion of the data because it turns out that the limitations to the implementation of
stadnard efficiency measurement technique is significantly driven by data restrictions.
4.1. The general focus of the efficiency measure and the data available
While the reform was decided in 1993 and the bulk of its implementation took most of 1994, the
new autonomous APIs needed another couple of year to put together a reasonable monitoring system
demanded by the Transport Subscretariat. The data available is annual and  spans over 4 years starting in
1996 and ending in 1999. It only covers the 14 APIs but these are the main ones. This provides a panel of
data of 56 observations which is large enough to rely on parametric methods and in particular on a
production frontier. The limited coverage is good enough to allow a fair assessment of the continued
progress and efforts made by the APIs to  meet the mandate assigned by the reformers. It is also good
enough to allow an assessment of the evolution of the relative performance of the main APIs.
The APIs covered by the study are: Ensenada, Guaymas, Topolobampo, Mazatlan, Manzanillo,
Lazaro Cardenas and Salina Cruz, on the Pacific coast of Mexico and Altamira, Tampico, Tuxpan,
Veracruz, Coatzacoalcos and Progreso, on the Atlantic coast. Excluding oil and its derivatives,  these APIs
handle 70% of the traffic going through the Mexican port system. This is significant. Among the largest
ports, the main ones missing are Puerto Madero, Puerto Vallarta and Acapulco due to lack of enough
comparable data. Puerto Madero was closed for a number of years while under repair. Puerto Vallarta is
mostly a tourist port and has very little cargo. Acapulco, also a mostly passenger oriented port,  has the
only API privatized  so far (since 1997).  Since Mexican law prevents  the regulator from requesting any cost
information, that could also be used by the fiscal authorities from any tax payer, no data is available on
that API. The rest of the ports are generally too  small to  allocate major resources to meet  detailed
regulatory informational requirements.
Since the ports are subject to a price cap and their interactions are designed to be competitive, it
would make sense to construct both cost and production efficiency  measures to identify possible rents from
a comparison of cost and production efficiency in preparation  for the revision of maximum tariff allowed.
The econometric techniques available so far however do not allow yet much inference from a comparison
of the efficiency estimated from  cost and production functions.'  While an  estimation of both the
production and cost frontier through stochastistic models should, in principle, allow for calculation of
technical and allocative efficiency from different but related information bases, the reality is that such
comparisons are still almost impossible to conduct in any robust way.
In view of the data restriction on the cost side, the analysis of the efficiency effect of the reforms
is based on a production frontier. A production frontier assumes  an output maximization rather than a cost
minimization effort.  '"  This may a reasonable assumption  when focusing on the promotion of competition
but may not be the most desirable one in view of the fact that the regulated tariffs are under a price cap
regime with the explicit purpose of promoting cost reductions. The fact that market shares are a clear
concern for APIs' managers and that most of the initial investment decisions were taken for them as part
10  See Coelli, Estache, Trujillo and Perelman (2001)
1  l In Mexico, the lack of a tradition of regulatory accounting is also a source of concern for the confidence  that can be attached
to cost data and the estimation of a cost function.I1
of the restructuring process suggests that the production orientation is overall a reasonable one. Indeed,
the efficiency measures generated from the production frontier in a sector with scale economies provide
information on the opportunities for expansion of outputs for a given quantity of inputs, for a given level
of costs 12..
The production variable reflecting the output of the infrastructure can be approximated by the
volume of merchandise  handled (in tons) in each API. This is clearly a second best. Ideally, it would have
been desirable to address the multi-product nature of the APIs activities through a disaggregation of the
various types of cargoes  handled and through the explicit  recognition  that APIs also provide other services
such equipment rental, commercial  building and space rental, water services  to the ships, etc..  .While these
activities confirm the multi-product nature of the APIs activities, the data on these other activities is
unfortunately not available for each port for the period covered. This is why we assume a single output
activity which focuses on the API's main activity: the operation of an infrastructure which supports the
loading and unloading of merchandise and takes the resulting volume of merchandise handled as an
approximation of each API's production.
The production function builds on three inputs: labor, capital and intermediate inputs. Labor is
measured by the number of workers in each API' 3.For some APIs, this includes workers used to load and
unload ships which in other APIs is a service provided by private operators. The four APIs providing
merchandise handling are: Topolobampo, Guaymas, Mazatlan and Salina Cruz. The capital input is
approximated by the surface concessioned by the government to the API, corrected by a percentage
reflecting the actual use of this capacity. As for the intermediate inputs, their heterogeneity impedes the
use of any physical measure, imposing instead the use of a monetary approximation. This is provided by
the sum of the expenditures on intermediate  input variables used here, they are expressed in constant 1994
prices. Table 3 summarizes the main statistics and illustrates the diversity of Mexican ports.
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Mexico's Main APIs
Variable  Average  Maximum  Minimum
Production (tons)  6,823,559  17,737,060  719,459
Labor input (workers)  66  226  13
Capital input (m2  )  4,113,642  213,909,375  29,216,300
Intermediate  inputs  (1994  million  22,412,050  131,070,006  2,704,849
pesos)
4.2. The specific model
The production frontier estimated is designed to get the best possible assessment of the sector's
potential efficiency gains during the period of observation and the average position of each port with
respect to these gains. This is important for the regulator since it needs to decide by how much the
maximum port tariff can be cut in each port to redistribute efficiency gains achieved since the reform to
12Under constant returns to scale, the results are quite different: Instead of increasing production x%, the firm could get the
same output by cutting inputs by I /x% and the corresponding change in costs can be calculated immediately  when factor prices
are known.
13 This number excludes all workers allocated only to loading and unloading of ships since that activity is not being measured
in this production function.12
port users.  The model must thus be able to allow the regulator to track down the average evolution of
efficiency in the sector but also to track down over time, as effectively  as possible, the absolute and relative
efficiency ranking of a panel of ports to  identify outliers-i.e.  systematic laggards or leaders. The
estimation of the model is allowed by the access to a panel of data which covers a four year period-i  996-
99-- that follows a two year implementation period which should have already built in the frontier shift
these reforms tend to introduce. In other words, catch up is the expected outcome measure to come from
this sampel rather than technological progress at this stage of the reforms.
Following the literature in the field, we tested two functional forms for a stochastic producion
function, a  Cobb-Douglas and a Translog. The estimates are based on the maximum likelihood method
relying on the FRONTIER package, version 4.1. The specific functional formal tested are the following:
ln Q,, = 83o  + ,I  ln K,, +  /82  ln L,, + 833  ln I,, + 84T + /5 ln(K,,  )2  +  /6  ln(K,,  )ln(L,,)
/87  ln(KJ,)ln(IJ,)+ 38  ln(K,,)T + 89 ln(LJ,) 2 + Ao0  ln(LJ,)ln(IJ)+ 1/3 ln(LJ,)T  +  (l)
+  A12  In(Ii, )2  +  A13  In(lJ,T  + A4T  2  + Vi,  _ Ui,
where: the variables are all deviations from the geometric mean and defined as follows:
i = 1,...,N  and t=1,...,N
Qit is the volume of merchandise handled in  port i during period  t
Kit is the capital used by port i in period t  as defined in  the text
Lit is the number of workers employed in port i in period t
Iit are intermediate inputs costs in port i in period t
T is a time trend
vit is the random error assumed to be iid distributed as a normal N(O,  c2v) and independently
distributed from uit which is a non negative random variable associated with technical inefficiency
and supposed  to be distributed  independently  as a N(O, ou 2)14.
Since the specification of the residual can in fact take various forms, we need a test to chose
between the various models. This can be done through a ratio of likelihood test which works as follows:
LR = -2{1n[L(H 0 )]  - ln[L(H, )D  (2)
where L(HO)  and L(HI) are the value of the likelihood function under the null assumption (Ho)  and the
alternative (H,), respectively. If H. is correct, this statistic LR is distributed as a x2 with as many diegree
of freedom as there are restrictions imposed.
Applied to the specification of the distribution of the inefficiency term, the tests leads sometimes
to reject the assumption of a normal. This rejection combined with the difficulty of estimating a model
14 The  term  -ui  cannot  be  observed  in practice.  Since the  frontier  has  been  estimated,  the  only  thing  observable  is the
difference  vi-ui,  the only solution  is to rely on a predictor  of this tern.  The best  one is the expected  value  of  vj  conditioned
to the value  of  vi-ui  . When the models includes explanatory variables for the efficiency of ports,  it becomes a N(,uit, au")  where
,U  = z it J,  and zit is the  vector of all variables which could influence the efficiency of ports and S is a vector of parameters to estimate
in the  modes  including  explanatory  variables  for  port  inefficiency13
under a normality assumption in such a small sample (Ritter and Simar, 1997), leads to the selection of
a semi-normal for the inefficiency term.
4.3. The statistical results
Table 4 presents the results  of a maximum likelihood estimate of the frontier under these
assumptions for three different  model spefications:  a translog with technological  change,  a translog  without
this change and Cobb-Douglas  without technological  change. The most striking  result from Table 4 is that
in every model the parameter y has a value not significantly different from 1. This suggests that most of
the fluctuations in the residual term is due  to inefficiency (Ui) and that the random error (Vi) is
approximatively 0.  This  implies  that  the  stochastic frontier  is  not  significantly different  from  a
deterministic frontier for these ports during this period. A reasonable explanation may be that the reforms
have significantly leveled the playing field and that at least in the short run, except for inefficiency, there
is not much scope for randomness in the system. Considering  that the reformers adjusted employment and
made most of the investment necessary as part of the reform implementation that preceded immediately
the period of estimation, determninism  seems to be acceptable intuitively.
Table 4. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Stochastic Frontiers
Coeficient  Translog  Translog  Cobb-Douglas
(nonneutral  technical  change)  (no  technical  change)  (no  technical  change)
Constant  0.405  0.565  0.901
(3.969)  (10.398)  (14.829)
Ln (K)  -0.142  -0.202  -0.156]
(-14.323)  (-4.107)  (-7.932)
Ln (L)  -0.169  0.169  0.106
(-0.801)  (2.208)  (0.777)
Ln (I)  0.700  0.185  0.007
(10.859)  (3.962)  (0.176)
Ln (T)  -0.168
(2.227)
Ln (K)?  0.200  0.079
(3.303)  (1.444)
Ln (K) Ln (L)  -0.418  -0.019
(-0.668)  (-0.160)
Ln (K) Ln (1)  0.335  0.151
(2.468)  (3.750)
Ln (K) Ln (T)  -0.066
(-0.845)
Ln (L)Z  2.781  1.500
(4.313)  (3.284)
Ln (L) Ln (I)  -1.956]  -0.558
(-4.995)  (-2.048)
Ln (L) Ln (T)  0.485
2___________  (4.052)
Ln (I)2  0.995  0.017
(6.270)  (0.066)




, 2 0.883  0.990  1.569
(21.484)  (7.108)  (3.256)
I  7  0.999  0.999  0.99914
(14051.3)  (7018185.8)  (2415717.7)
Log  Likelihood  -37.225  -37.961  -47.609
funcion
The t statistic is given in parenthesis below the corresponding coefficient.
In addition, the analysis of the significance  of the coefficients  reported in Table 4 provides useful insights.
The estimation of the frontier which assumes no technological change has  only 3 non-significant
coefficients  while the specifications  with technological  change shows 4 non significant  coefficients. Since
we estimated the translog as an approximation to an unknown form, the first order coefficients are the
elasticities of production at the expansion  point and the other coefficients are less important. The negative
sign on capital reflects the fact that for the period covered by the analysis,  there is an excess capacity.This
results from significant investments made by the government at the initial stages of the restructuring
process. Addition to the capital factor is a burden in the short run rather than an asset and a source of
efficiency gains for the system as a whole. To be as complete as possible we also need to compare the
relative validity of the various specifications. This is achieved through likelihood ratios tests reported in
Table 5.
Table 5. Tests of the various specifications of the frontier
Restrictions  Model  Log  Likelihood  Critical value  Decision





)°O  3.Translog  (OLS)  -48.16  20.39  2.71  (*)  Rejeci
(no technical
inefficiency)
A4=68=81  1=813=,61  2.Translog  -37.96  1.47  11.07  Do not reject
4=0  (no non-neutral
technical change)
85=66=  B7=A89l  O= 4. Cobb-Douglas  -47.61  19.29  12.59  Reject
812=0  (no technological
change)
(*) Critical  Value  obtained  from Table I in Kodde  and Palm  (1986).
Table 6 summarizes the various restrictions tested on each model, the test value calculated and the
corresponding critical value of the x2 distribution at 5% of significance. The last column specifies the
decision revealed by the test on each set of parameters restrictions. The first test checks for the presence
or absence of technical inefficiency in the port industry. If there is no such inefficiency, Uit could be
eliminated from the model and it could be estimated though OLS's. This corresponds to a test of HO: r= 0 .
The statistical value 20.39 is larger than the critical value and hence the assumption is rejected, meaning
that technical inefficiency must be included.
15  When Ho:rO  is right,  the production  function  is equivalent  to a regular  average  response  function  and OLS  estimates  will
yield efficient estimates.15
With respect to technology, two aspects were considered. The first tests the existence of non-
neutral technological change. The calculated value (1.47) is lower than the critical value and hence we
cannot reject the specification without technological change. This is a bit confusing since the direct
assessment based on the significance of the coefficients would have suggested the opposite. Once more
the very short period covered by the analysis which follows a strong sector adjustment may provide the
explanation. The second test refers to the evaluation of a Cobb-Douglas  as a representation  of production
technology. The calculated test value (19.29) is greater than the critical value (12.59) and hence the
translog function can be considered a better choice to represent  the production technology of the Mexican
port sector.
4.4. The efficiency scores
With the statistical results settled, we can now assess the technical efficiency of each port in each
year based on the translog production function specified earlier. The annual estimates and their average
for each port and for the port system as a while are reported in Table 6. The average technical efficiency
of the Mexican ports for the period is  58.8% when the outlier Ensenada is included. This is within the
order of magnitude of other estimates in the sector as seen in Table 1. The average without Ensenada is
even higher. The variance across ports is however generally quite high. It varies from 6. 1% in  Ensenada
in 1996 and  99.9% in  Salina Cruz and Tuxpan en 1996; Manzanillo and Lazaro Cardenas in 1998; and
Manzanillo en 1999.16  From an overall policy viewpoint, the results confirm that the expected gains from
reform are becoming reality.
Table 6. Evolution of the port specific technical efficiency (in %)
Year  Ens  Gua  Top  Maz  Man  LC  SC  Alt  Tam  Tux  Ver  Coa  Pro  Avge  Average
without  With
Ensenada  Ensenada
1996  0.061  0.610  0.722  0.234  0.726  0.334  0.999  0.227  0.841  0.999  0.248  0.227  0.678  0.570  0.531
1997  0.071  0.566  0.726  0.298  0.849  0.828  0.943  0.305  0.743  0.853  0.541  0.229  0.777  0.638  0.594
1998  0.086  0.419  0.631  0.347  0.999  0.999  0.896  0.413  0.698  0.996  0.903  0.306  0.573  0.682  0.636
1999  0.106  0.370  0.779  0.368  0.999  0.702  0.671  0.457  0.665  0.960  0.735  0.239  0.643  0.632  0.592
Average  0.081  0.491  0.715  0.312  0.893  0.716  0.877  0.350  0.737  0.952  0.607  0.250  0.668  0.631  0.588
efficiency
level




Total  55.3  -50  7.6  45.3  31.9  74.3  -39.8  70.0  -23.0  -4.0  109  5.2  -5.3  18.4  25.0
Catchup
During that period,  the annual average technical efficiency  increased from 53.1% in 1996 to 63.6%
in 1998.-and  is in fact higher when one ignores the clear outlier, Ensenada. The last year of the period
saw a decline, possibly reflecting a demand shock resulting from the Asian crisis which the model is not
16 Ensenada is somewhat of an outlier because it was a fishing port until the early 1990s and is only progressively starting to
handle containers for less than 10 years. In fact most of its recent growth seems to be coming from passenger ferrys.16
accounting for explicitly. A potential source of concern for port regulators is that a couple of ports
(Guaymas and Salinas Cruz) are showing a decline in efficiency which deserve a closer look.
The last two rows of the table give the average annual catch-up rate (measured by the rate of
change in the technical efficiency measure)  and the total rate for the period under observation (the
accumulated  rate of change obtained from a comparison  of the beginning and end of period effiency level).
The last row shows that 5 ports (Guaymas, Salinas  Cruz, Tampico,  Tuxpan and Progreso)  lost some ground
to the frontier over the period and with the exception of Tuxpan and Progreso for which the loss ground
is minor and may simply reflect a demand shock,  the regulators should be interested  in taking a closer look
reasons for the deterioration in the other three ports. The average annual growth rate should also be useful
to the regulator in that it gives an educated guess on the range of average efficiency  gains the ports should
have been able to achieve over the period. This can be used to specify the reduction in price cap to be
allowed for the next regulatory period of 5 years. In other words, the average efficiency  gains in the sector
was around 6-8% since the reform. Any port which did not achieve  that should provide a good  justification
in order not to see its maximum tariffs cut by that much. "
4.5. Towards yardstick competition in the Mexican port sector
The frontiers as estimated here have just as many advantages and disadvantages as many of the
other instruments regulators must rely on-asset  valuation for instance is one of the key jobs of any
regulator and is at least as controversial as efficiency measurement in the context of regulated industries.
The disadvantages are obvious once you try to put together a data base from scratch and start having to
make assumptions for almost every input and even for the number of outputs you can take into account.
But for most practitioners, in particular in countries in which governance (i.e. corruption) is an issue, the
transparency of the information gathering process and of the estimation rules selected here allows an
increased accountability for all parties involved and better fairness in regulatory decisions. Ranking is
likely to be more robust than the specific estimates and this makes this instrument useful for weak forms
of yardstick competition in spite of any reservation the policymakers may have on the specific efficiency
scores.
By way of illustration, Table 7 provides a ranking of the four best and four worse performers in
terms of efficiency levels every year in an effort to reveal some performance patterns in technical
efficiency-the  regulator could also look into the ranking in terms of efficiency changes  just discussed as
a complement. Given this approach to ranking and given the methodology adopted to estimate efficiency,
there is no doubt that Manzanillo and Tuxpan  are the only port consistently among the best performers and
Veracruz has joined them for the last two years. At the other extreme, the worse performers included
Ensenada, Coatzacoalcos and Mazatlan. Altamira has managed to pull out of that group in 99. While this
is clearly not sufficient to be used as a yardstick competition system, the results are robust enough to
suggest that the regulator does have some problems on its hands and that it may be worth to take a closer
look at the worse performers.
17 Taking  the specific  figures  in every  cell of Table  6 for granted  would  not be a good  move  for any  regulator.  Minor  changes
in  the specification  of the model  could change  some of them  even if they do not change  the ranking  or the overall  trend17
Table 7. Ranking  of technical  efficiency' 8
Year  Maximum  Minimum
1996  Salina  Cruz, Tuxpan,  Tampico  Ensenada,  Coatzacoalcos,Altarnira
Manzanillo  Mazatlan
1997  Salina  Cruz,  Tuxpan,Manzanillo  Ensenada,  Coatzacoalcos,  Mazatlan
Lazaro  CArdenas  Altamira
1998  Lazaro  Cardenas,  Manzanillo,  Tuxpan  Ensenada,  Coatzacoalcos,Mazatlan
Veracruz  Altainira
1999  Manzanillo,  Tuxpan,Topolobampo  Ensenada,  Coatzacoalcos,  Mazatlan
Veracruz  Guaymas
The regulators could decide to zoom only on the top and bottom 3 or to the contrary on the top and
bottom 5. They could also decide that DEA or distance functions are more appropriate because they can
deal with  multiple outputs.  Indeed, since the production level  is approximated by the  volume of
merchandise handled, the characteristics of these three ports may have penalized them more than the
others. Coatzacoalcos only restarted container manipulation in 1999, while Ensenada-in  addition to
suffering from its proximity to the US ports-and  Mazatlan  should also have received more credit for their
important handling of passenger traffic which is not allowed by the single output assumption of the
production function estimated. This is why these results should be seen only as a beginning of the
analytical work supporting the policy decisions.
The fact is that within their short run data constraints,  regulators  have many choices and must make
decisions--ideally  in consultation  with the regulated operators.  Once taken, these decisions define the rules
of the game for interactions  between the various actors. Once these games rules are set, competition to be
on the top and reduce the risk of detailed audits for being an underperformer can become effective. The
desire  to sustain competition in the sector depends on the ability to create  the right incentives. Comparative
efficiency measures, however they are generated, can help in ports, just  like they helped in water or
electricity in the UK and Australia for instance. This paper suggests that it should also be possible to do
it in a developing country context.
5. Concluding comments
There are three main conclusions to the paper. The first is that the reforms have resulted in
significant improvements in the performance of ports on average. The average annual growth rate in
efficiency was between 6 and 8% for the sector. This adds up to an almost 10% point increase in the
average efficiency level over a 4 year period which starts two years after the reform were implemented.
This is a significant  achievement. Even if a couple of ports have not followed the trend, the results suggest
that there is something  virtuous about the trend promoted by the reforms. There is some scope for concern
with a partial reversal in the last year of the period but as mentioned earlier, this is probably a demand
driven slowdown. The lack of detailed information  on the specific sources of efficiency  growth due to lack
18 The ranking  that  would  have  obtained  from  a simple  analysis  of labor  productivity  would  not have  implied  a major change
with  a significant  exception.  Veracruz  which  according  to the technical  efficiency  measure  is one  of the best perforning port
would  have  fared  quite  poorly.  Indeed,  its labor  productivity  is one of the poorest  in  the country.  The port  handles  13%  of the
output  with  26% of the total  of workers,  7%  of the capital  and 12%  of total  intermnediate  inputs.  Simnilarly,  the analysis  of capital
productivity  also coincides  somewhat with the technical  efficiency  ranking but also shows a few exception.  Capital
productivity  indicators  overestimate  the ranking  of Guaymas  while  they  underestimate  the ranking  Tampico  and Topolobampo.18
of data  can also be a concern. From the viewpoint of a regulator, however, what matters mostly in the
context of a tariff revision is the extent to which a specific port achieves efficiency gains which can be
passed on to the port users and which can be showcased to other ports to promote competition and these
estimates provides a reasonably rigorous estimate. This is a useful lower bound for what these gains may
have been.
The second is that the analytically sound performance rankings allowed by these port specific
efficiency measures can help in promoting yardstick competition in the sector. This ranking is superior to
the one that would emerge from a ranking based on partial productivity  indicators. It accounts for the  joint
effects of all inputs on outputs. This is crucial because it avoids the risks on inconsistent rankings based
on different arbitrary choice of partial indicators.
Finally, while hopefully the paper provides some light on the potential payoffs from efforts to
measure technical efficiency to assess the caching up effect generated  by reform, it does not do justice to
the sweat and tears that go into developing the data base needed to measure efficiency in countries without
a strong tradition of putting consistent and policy relevant data bases together. While the objective of
trying to come up with a fair quantitative  ranking is clearly  policy relevant, it is important to recognize  that
the task is a major challenge in most developing countries, in particular in transport sectors where the
tradition to generate  policy friendly information is still in its infancy. Even in almost ideal situations-i.e.
when the regulator actually  want to identify the necessary  information--as  is the case in Mexico--,  the most
immediate impact of the exercise was to reveal the poverty of the data base and the need for the regulators
to invest in its development. In the end, the quality of the data did define our ability to be specific in the
performance ranking challenge subce the quality of the model specification is driven by data limitations.
With this initial work, the regulator should be able to improve upon these results for future policy use.19
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